摘要
在人格解体/现实解体（DP/DR）的急性发作期间，人们报告他们的感知体验发生了复杂而特殊的变化。具体来说，现实感缺失描述了与外部世界分离的体验以及视觉感知的改变，其中周围环境看起来褪色、雾气重重或如梦似幻。虽然有些人认为现实解体可能不会带来真正的感知变化，但这一提议仍有待实证检验。因此，我们着手研究现实解体中潜在的感知变化。在这份注册报告中，我们进行了两项在线实验，以揭示 DP/DR 症状的影响——剑桥人格解体量表 (CDS) 的状态版本对人们如何评估（实验 1， = 200，CDS 状态平均值：32.43 ± 29.94 SD）和调整（实验 2， = 125，CDS 状态平均值： 29.38 ± 30.47 SD）具有不同饱和度和对比度的自然场景图像。参与者被要求评价所呈现的图像与他们的日常体验相比的真实程度（在实验 1 中），并调整图像的对比度或饱和度以匹配他们的日常视觉体验（在实验 2 中）。我们测试了 CDS 状态分数对这些主观评分模型与贝叶斯因子的影响。在这两个实验中，我们发现了支持无效模型的有力证据，表明 DP/DR 症状不会影响真实性评级或鲜艳度调整。这些结果为理论提供了实证支持，这些理论表明，自我报告的现实解体中生动性体验的改变并不反映真正的知觉变化，而是意味着对这些体验的（元）认知解释。我们在评估现实解体时讨论了当前研究实践的利弊，并强调了未来研究的关键途径。
查看英文原文摘要
During an acute episode of depersonalization/derealization (DP/DR), people report a complex and idiosyncratic change in their perceptual experience. Specifically, derealisation describes the experience of detachment from the external world and altered visual perception in which the surroundings look faded, foggy, or dream-like. Whilst some have argued that there may not be genuine perceptual changes in derealization, this proposal is yet to be tested empirically. Thus, we set out to investigate the potential perceptual changes in derealization. In this Registered Report, we conducted two online experiments to reveal the impact of DP/DR symptoms measuredthe state version of the Cambridge Depersonalisation Scale (CDS) on how people evaluate (Experiment 1, = 200, CDS-state mean: 32.43 ± 29.94 SD) and adjust (Experiment 2, = 125, CDS-state mean: 29.38 ± 30.47 SD) naturalistic scene images with different levels of saturation and contrast. Participants were asked to rate how real the presented images look compared to their everyday experience (in Experiment 1) and to adjust the contrast or saturation level of images to match their everyday visual experience (in Experiment 2). We tested the effect of CDS-state scores on these subjective ratingsmodel comparison with Bayes Factors. In both experiments, we found strong evidence supporting the null models, suggesting that DP/DR symptoms did not affect realness ratings or vividness adjustments. These results provide empirical support for theories suggesting that self-reported altered vividness experience in derealization does not reflect genuine perceptual changes, instead they signify the (meta-)cognitive interpretation of these experiences. We discuss pros and cons of the current research practices when assessing derealization and highlight key avenues for the future investigation.